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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we investigate how pyramid structure, separating cash flow rights and control 
rights, allows ultimate owners to control the company's resources for the creation of private 
benefits and to avoid punishment for such conduct. Empirical tests are conducted using three-
stage least squares regression. The estimated results provide support for the hypotheses 
proposed that the separation of cash flow rights and control rights have led to the use of 
excess leverage among pyramidal companies to preserve ultimate owners' control. High 
levels of leverage, affect the firm's valuation negatively because of the potential for financial 
distress. Thus, our findings may provide one additional explanation for the severity of the 
decrease in corporate value among the pyramidal companies in Malaysia as pointed out in the 
studies of Claessens et al. (2002), Lins (2003), and Lemmon and Lins (2003). Secondly, the 
empirical evidence from this study provides insight into the forces that influence corporate 
valuation of firms in developed countries particularly those that have pyramidal structure. 
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